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clusions. Nevertheless, it is possible to state some rather definite conclusions,
The consent decree appears unlikely to be successful in any great degree.
The Interstate Commerce Commission has the power to solve the problem,
but to date that power has not been exercised effectively. If neither the
decree nor action by the Commission proves successful, divorcement appears
to be the best solution. Perhaps a gradual policy would be sufficient to
induce the oil companies to lower rates and eliminate repressive service
regulations. On the other hand, it may be necessary for the Congress, or
for the Department of justice, to resort to the divorcement technique on
a large scale. Divorcement would solve the problem, in large measure, but
without further administrative regulation there is no guarantee that the pipe
lines will be made completely accessible to the independent refiners. Perhaps
government ownership, on a small or large scale, may prove the ultimate
answer.
SPECIAL LEGISLATION DISCRIMINATING AGAINST
SPECIFIED INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS
SPECIAL legislation directed expressly against specified individuals and
groups is today being employed by Congress as a repressive technique in
the usual drive during emergencies against allegedly subversive elements.
Measures of this type - the only instances in Congressional history, as far
as can be determined -include a bill ordering Harry Bridges deported,1 a
measure requiring registration of the Communist Party and named Bund
groups as foreign agents,2 and provisions in appropriation bills forbidding
salary payments to certain named individuals. 3 In the past such legislation
has usually been invoked, by Parliament in England and by state legislatures
in America, during times of stress and in cases which have aroused strong
popular feeling. Invariably this technique has been used because the people
mentioned in the special acts have not been subject to punishment under
existing law and no general law could have been framed to reach them.
All but four of the state constitutions contain express restrictions against
the enactment of special legislation.4 Such restrictions were not included
in the original constitutions but were incorporated later in an attempt to
curb the abuse of special law making powers. The uncontrolled exercise of
these powers had led in many instances to corruption in the legislative bodies,
1. H. R. 9766, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess. (June 13, 1940).
2. H. R. 6269, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (Dec. 19, 1941).
3. PUB. L. No. 143, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (July 1, 1941) § 1(a); H. R. 6430, 77th
Cong., 2nd Sess. (Jan. 22, 1942).
4. Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont. See Cloe and Marcus,
Special and Local Legislation (1936) 24 Ky. L. J. 351.
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diversity of laws applicable within the states, and arbitrary discriminations
both among individuals and localities. Moreover, with general laws uften
the exception rather than the rule, the volume of legislation had increased
to such proportions as to cripple the effectiveness of the legislatures. These
constitutional restrictions apply not only to special laws directed against
named individuals5 but also to laws passed for the benefit of specific persons
and groups. They generally designate cases in which special laws shall not
be employed and contain a cover-all provision prohibiting passage of special
laws when a general law can be used. 6
No such express restrictions are included in the Federal Constitution,
and, indeed, in every session of Congress private bills are passed for the
benefit of named individuals with their consent. On the other hand,
passage of legislation directed against specified individuals without their con-
sent is restricted by several constitutional provisions. Thus Article I, Section
9, provides that no bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed. Al-
though the meaning of the ex post facto clause has been the subject of some
discussion,7 it has always been held that it covers only retroactive criminal
legislation.8 It is important, therefore, in considering the constitutionality of
special legislation in the light of the ex post facto prohibition to determine
whether the statute is criminal. On the other hand, it is recognized that the
sanction against ex post facto laws was intended to secure substantial personal
rights against arbitrary and oppressive legislation ;O consequently, a law may
be invalid as ex post facto even though it does not expressly declare the
penalized action to be criminal.10 Every special act directed against an
individual or group is in reality ex post facto, for it punishes actions which
until the time of passage of the special act were not punishable under any
existing law. Because, however, the majority of such acts are not criminal
in nature, they do not fall within the constitutional prohibition.
A bill of attainder, in the modem sense of the term, is a legislative
act which imposes either absolute or conditional punishment without a
judicial trial. If the punishment is less than death, the act is termed a
bill of pains and penalties, but within the meaning of the Constitution, bills
5. The states are now prevented from passing legislation of this lind by the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Cotting v. Kansas City Stee: Yards
Co. and the State of Kansas, 133 U. S. 79 (1901).
6. For a discussion of the types of state restrictions and their history, see Bmrmv,
RESTrCTONS UPON SPECIAL AND LocAL LEGISLATION (1394) ; Cloe and Marcus, Speial
and Local Legislationr (1936) 24 Ky. L. J. 351.
7. See Field, Ex post facto i4 the Constitution (1922) 20 MfICH. L. rV. 315.
S. Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 385 (U. S. 1793).
9. See Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U. S. 167, 171 (1925).
10. See State v. Keith, 63 N. C. 140 (1869) (repeal of amnesty law held ex pQst
facto as to cases covered by the law); 1 CooLrE. CoNsmorno,,1AL LuTrrxno:s (1927)
541 et seq. In other words, whether a la, falls within the ex post facto clause depends
on whether the punishment it imposes is of a criminal nature.
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of attainder include bills of pains and penalties. 1 Dispensing with the
ordinary judicial forms and precedents, these bills take from the accused
all the advantages he might have in the courts of law. Thus many bills of
attainder were passed with no hearings and no evidence, or only evidence
unfavorable to the accused. Such bills were employed in England for the
direct punishment of political offenses. 12 Although today, because of strong
public disapproval, bills of attainder have fallen into disuse there, no formal
prohibitions exist against their passage. In the American colonies bills of
pains and penalties were used during and after the Revolution to effect the
banishment of loyalists and the confiscation of their property.13 These measures
were later widely condemned. It was the memory of them and of the English
acts preceding them which led the members of the Constitutional Convention
to insert in the main body of the Constitution prohibitions against the use of
bills of attainder by Congress or the state legislatures.' 4
Only once has the Supreme Court found an Act of Congress to be a
violation of this provision." That Act, growing out of the Civil War, was
designed to exclude from practice in the United States Courts all persons who
had taken up arms against the government or who had voluntarily given aid
and encouragement to its enemies during the rebellion by requiring an oath
negativing any such conduct as a condition to practice. Defining punishment
as a deprivation of any rights, civil or political, the Court held the law to
be a bill of attainder and therefore void. At the same time and upon the
same reasoning the Court held void a clause of the Constitution of Missouri
which, among other things, excluded all priests and clergymen from preaching
unless they took a similar oath of loyalty. 16
More general restrictions on all types of repressive special legislation are
embodied in the due process clause and the concept of the separation of powers.
The requirement of separation of powers does not prevent Congress from
creating a special personal right in private bills.17 But it does prevent Congress
from adjudicating or destroying rights already in existence, for this is a part
of the judicial function. 18 Likewise, the requirement of due process is now
11. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333 (U. S. 1866); Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall,
277 (U. S. 1866); see also 2 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION (5t cd,
1891) 216; 2 WooDEssoN, LECTURES (Am. ed. 1842) 509 et seq.
12. Bills of attainder were widely used during the reigns of the Tudor and Stuart
kings as a means of disposing of distinguished persons who could not be charged with
any offense under the existing law.
13. See Thompson, Anti-Loyalist Legislation during the Revohilion (1908) 3 ILL.
L. REv. 81, 147.
14. See MADISoN, DEBATES (Inter. ed. 1920) 449.
15. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333 (U. S. 1866).
16. Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277 (U. S. 1866).
17. Paramino Lumber Co. v. Marshall, 309 U. S. 370 (1940).
18. See Green, Separation of Governmental Powers, in 4 SELECr EssAYs ON CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW (1938) 202; HoRAcm, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION (1940)
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held to apply to Congressional action10 although at first it wag taken to
apply only to proceedings in a court of law. And while the Supreme Court
has never had occasion to consider the problem directly, it has indicated,
in numerous dicta, that special discriminatory legislation might offend the
requirements of procedural due process.20 Besides these constitutional restric-
tions against special legislation, Congress itself has expressed its disapproval
of special bills by prohibiting their use in tie Territories,2 and in the instances
here considered it resorted to the method only after the failure of efforts tu
achieve the desired results through established procedures.
Among the recent examples of repressive special legislation is tile bill
which directed the Attorney General to take the alien Bridges into custody
and deport him.22 At the time the bill was introduced, the regular deportation
19. Adldns v. Childrens Hospital, 261 U. S. 525 (1922). See also Murray v. Hoba-
ken Land & Improvement Co., 18 How. 272 (U. S. 1855) ; Adair v. United States, 203 U.
S. 161 (1908); Weeds v. United States, 255 U. S. 1909 (1921); cf. Wilson v. New, 243
U. S. 332, at 355, 365 (1917).
20. See, for example, Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, at 535, 536 (1834): "Due
process of law in the latter (the Fifth Amendment) refers to that law of the land
which derives its authority from the legislative powers conferred upon Congress by
the Constitution of the United States, exercised within the limits therein prescribed,
and interpreted according to the principles of common law. . . . But it is not t.) be
supposed that these legislative powers are absolute and despotic, and that the amend-
ment prescribing due process of law is too vague and indefinite to operate as a practical
restraint. It is not every act, legislative in form, that is law. Law is something more
than mere Will exerted as an act of power. It must be not a special rule for a par-
ticular case, but, in the language of Mr. Webster, in his familiar definition, 'the general
law, a law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry, and renders
judgment only after trial', so 'that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property
and immunities under the protection of the general rules which govern society', and
thus excluding, as not due process of law, acts of attainder, bills of pains and penalties,
acts of confiscation, acts reversing judgments, and acts directly transferring one man's
estate to another, legislative judgments and decrees, and other similar special, partial,
and arbitrary exertion of power under the forms of legislation." See also Bunrci:.
LAW OF THE A,=mcAw CONSTITUTiON (1922) 419; 2 STORY, COMME1.TAr1Es o: THE
CoxsTITUTIox (5th ed. 1891) 6S9; TAYiLOR, DUE PRocEss or LAW AND EOTAL Pro-
TECTION OF TE LAWS (1917) 307; 3 WLLoVuanv, CONSTM ONZAL LAW (1929) 1928,
1929. For the opposite view see Hall, Due Process of Late and Class Legislatlion (1909)
43 Am. L. REn 926. For a discussion of the development of the relation between due
process and equality, see ,forr, DUE PRoCESS OF LAw (1926) 256 ci seq.
21. 24 STAT. 170 (1886), 48 U. S. C. § 1471 (1934). See United States v. Strum-
berger, 9 Alaska 689, 696 (1940).
22. The Bridges bill, H. R. 9766, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess. (June 13, 1940), read:
"Be it enacted . . . That notwithstanding any other provision of law the Attorney
General be, and is hereby authorized and directed to take into custody forthwith and
deport forthwith to Australia, the country of which he is a citizen or subject, the alien,
Harry Renton Bridges, whose presence in this country the Congress deems hurtful."
Sponsored by the American Legion, it was passed by the House on June 13, 1940 by
a vote of 330-42. See 86 CoNG. REc. 8215 (1940). It then went to the Senate Com-
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procedure involved a warrant of arrest from the Department of Labor and
a hearing before a trial examiner to determine whether the alien came within
the class deportable'under the general statutes. 28 After the hearing the record
and the recommendations of the trial examiner were reviewed by a board
set up in the Department of Labor. The final decision as to whether a
warrant of deportation should issue was made by an assistant to the Secretary
of Labor and was based on the recommendations of the board. In the case
of Bridges this procedure ended in a dismissal of the charges against him and
the cancellation of his warrant of arrest.24 After this unsuccessful attempt to
deport him through the regular means, the bill ordering his deportation was
introduced in the House.
The Bridges bill would seem to have been an unconstitutional exercise of
the Congressional power over aliens. For while Congress has the power
inherent in all sovereign states to order the deportation or exclusion of
mittee on Immigration which found it unconstitutional and reported it back with an
amendment. SEN. REP. No. 2031, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess. (1940). It was denounced as
unconstitutional by Attorney General Robert Jackson in a letter to Senator Russell,
86 CONG. REC. App. 4155 (1940), by Solicitor General Francis Biddle in a speech
before the American Bar Association, 86 CONG. REc. APP. 4184 (1940), aud by
the American Bar Association, 86 CONG. REc. 11927 (1940). For the opposite
view see SEN. REP. No. 2031, Part 2, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess. (1940). For a chronological
review of Bridges's activities see 87 Cong. Rec. App., March 25, 1942, at A1301. A
second special bill for the deportation of Bridges is now pending in the House.
H.R.1644, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (Oct. 6, 1941). But there may be no need for it
since second deportation proceedings, instituted against Bridges on January 2, 1942,
culminated on May 28, 1942, in an order from Attorney General Biddle for his deporta-
tion. See N. Y. Times, June 5, 1942, p. 38, col. 3.
23. For a history of the United States deportation laws, and an analysis of the
classes of aliens who may be deported and of the procedural requirements involved,
see Klainer, Deportation of Aliens (1935) 15 B. U. L. Rav. 663. For a critical examina-
tion of the law, see Puttkammer, Legislation Affecting Dcporlation of Aliens (1936)
3 U. oF Cmi. L. Rav. 229. Since the first Bridges proceedings the deportation procedure
has been removed from the Department of Labor to the Department of Justice.
24. Deportation proceedings against Bridges were instituted by the Secretary of
Labor on March 2, 1938 on the ground that after Bridges entered the United States
he became a member of or affiliated with an organization which "advises, advocates,
and teaches the overthrow by force and violence of the government of the United States"
or that he became a member of or affiliated with an organization that "causes to be
written, circulated, distributed, printed, published, and displayed, printed matter advis-
ing, advocating, and teaching the overthrow by force and violence of the Government
of the United States." 40 STAT. 1012 (1918), 8 U. S. C. 137 (1934). Following the
decision of the Supreme Court in Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U. S. 22 (1939), the warrant
was amended so as to charge that Bridges both had been and was affiliated with such
an organization. James M. Landis, was appointed trial examiner by the Secretary of
Labor. The hearings lasted nine weeks and produced 7,724 pages of testimony and
274 exhibits. Dean Landis's findings and conclusions were 152 pages in length and to
the effect that Bridges was not established by the evidence to be a member of or
affiliated with an organization of the kind described.
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aliens, 25 it may not exercise this power in an unconstitutional manner. And
the Bridges bill would seem to contravene the due process clause and the
prohibition against bills of attainder.
The broad guarantee of personal liberty in the Fifth Amendment does
not distinguish between citizens and aliens but lays down the rule that
no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law.26 Under the Supreme Court's interpretation of due process an alien
who has entered this country and become in all respects subject to its juris-
diction may not be taken into custody and deported without having an oppor-
tunity to be heard concerning his right to remain in the United States -'
Deportation by legislative order permits of no hearing, and is, therefore, a
denial of due process. 28
Since legislative punishment is the essence of a bill of attainder,20 the
crucial question concerning the Bridges measure on this point is whether
deportation is punishment. Although the Supreme Court has never decided
whether deportation is punishment of a kind prohibited by the bill of
attainder clause, it has made the broad statement in some of its opinions
that deportation is not punishment. However, in these cases the Court's
actual holding was that deportation is not such punishment as entitles the
alien to a trial by jury30 or enables him to invoke the constitutional pro-
hibition against ex post facto laws.3 ' In fact deportation is clearly punish-
25. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U. S. 276 (1922) ; Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U. S.
585 (1913); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U. S. 228 (1896); Fong Yue Ting
v. United States, 149 U. S. 698 (1893); Chung Yim v. United States, 78 F. (2d) 43
(C. C.A. 8th, 1935), cert. den. 56 Sup. Ct. 150 (1935). See also Hmnsim, Ess:mTALs
OF INTER-ATIO.NAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION (1927) 369; HALL, INTEnZTIO.NAL LAW
(8th ed. 1924) 264, 265; 1 OPPENHEIM, INTRNATI -.AL LAW (1920) 493; 1 NVWiT,%E,
I.TERNTATIONAL LAW (1904) 217.
26. Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33 (1915); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U. S.
228 (1896); Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U. S. 538 (1895); Yilcl Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886).
27. United States v. Jung Ah Lung, 124 U. S. 621, 632 (1888); Ungar v. Seaman,
4 F. (2d) 80 (C. C. A. 8th, 1924); McDonald v. Sui Tak Sam, 225 Fed. 710 (C. C. A.
8th, 1915); accord, Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U. S. 86, 101 (1903); See United
States ex rel. Vajtaner v. Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U. S. 103, 106 (1927);
Bufalino v. Irvine, 103 F. (2d) 830, 8 32 (C. C. A. 10th, 1939); Richardson, Fair
Hearing in Deportation Proceedings (1927) 20 LAw. AND BANY._ 241.
28. A legislative hearing probably would not satisfy the requirement. For if
Congress does not select an agency to administer its policy, a judicial investigation
must be allowed. United States v. Jung Ah Lung, 124 U. S. 621 (1.8). See also
McDonald v. Siu Tak Sam, 225 Fed. 710 (C. C. A. 8th, 1915) (that there must
be a fair and impartial hearing by some tribunal established for that purpose).
29. Ex pare Garland, 4 Wall. 333 (U. S. 166).
30. Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U. S. 585, 591 (1913); Wong Wing v. United
States, 163 U. S. 228 (1896); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 693 (1893).
31. Mahler v. Eby, 264 U. S. 32 (1924). See also 1 IMLOUGHBv, CoNsTITuTNoNx.
LAw (1929) 325.
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ment,3 2 and some of the lower courts have so held. 88 It involves an arrest,
a deprivation of liberty, and often a removal from home, family, and property.
In the words of Mr. Justice Brandeis it deprives an alien of "all that makes
life worth living."34 Moreover, when Congress orders the deportation of
a specified alien, its intention is not only to get rid of him but also to punish
him for his activities while here. If deportation is punishment, an act deport-
ing an alien without judicial trial is a bill of attainder and expressly prohibited
by the Constitution.85
The case of Tiaco v. Forbes38 has been cited as precedent for the proposi-
tion that Congress has power to order the deportation of any specific alien
whose presence in this country it deems harmful. In that case the Governor
General of the Philippines, acting under the general authority vested in his
32. In a strong dissent in Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 740
(1893) Mr. Justice Brewer made this point clear: "But it needs no citation of authorities
to support the proposition that deportation is punishment. Everyone knows that to be
forcibly taken away from home, and family, and friends, and business, and property,
and sent across the ocean to a distant land, is punishment; and that oftentimes most
severe and cruel." See also Madison's discussion of the Alien and Sedition Laws of
1798 in 4 ELLIo's DEBATES (1866) 555: "If the banishment of an alien from a country
into which he has been invited as the asylum most auspicious to his happiness--a
country where he may have formed the most tender connections; where he may have
invested his entire property, and acquired property of the real and permanent, as well
as the movable and temporary kind; where he enjoys, under the laws, a greater share of
the blessings of personal security, and personal liberty, than he can elsewhere hope for;
and where he may have nearly completed his probationary title to citizenship; if, more-
over, in the execution of the sentence against him he is to be exposed, not only to the
ordinary dangers of the sea, but to the peculiar casualties incident to a crisis of war
and to unusual licentiousness on that element and possibly to vindictive purposes, which
his immigration itself may have provoked; if a banishment of this sort be not punish-
ment and among the severest of punishments it would be difficult to imagine a doom to
which the name could be applied." See also 88 Cong. Rec., March 18, 1942, at 2697
(bill for the relief of Mrs. Cecilia Pitt whose husband committed suicide for fear he
would be deported to Danzig).
33. Wallis v. Tecchio, 65 F. (2d) 250 (C.C.A. 5th, 1933). See also United States
ex rel. Klonis v. Davis, 13 F. (2d) (C. C. A. 2d, 1926) 630.
34. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U. S. 276, 284 (1922).
35. As has been explained, p. 1359 supra, a bill of attainder is a legislative act
which inflicts punishment without a judicial trial. In deporting an alien a judicial trial
is, of course, not required even in the regular procedure unless the alien has a real
claim to citizenship. See note 27 supra. It might, therefore, be argued in the light of
the definition of bills of attainder that legislative deportation is not a violation of the
constitutional prohibition against them. In the regular proceeding, however, the alien
is entitled to a fair hearing and a judicial review on the question of whether a fair hear-
ing was accorded him. See note 27 supra.
36. 228 U. S. 549 (1913). This case has been cited by the Supreme Court in a
deportation case only once. Mr. Chief Justice Taft used it in Mahler v. Eby, 264
U. S. 32 (1924) to support his contention that Congress can delegate its power over
aliens to "executive" agencies.
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office, had ordered twelve specified aliens deported. The Philippine Legis-lature later ratified the act. In a suit for damages brought by the aliens
against the Governor General, the Supreme Court, affirming the dismissal
of the actions, construed the deportation as "having been ordered by the
Governor General in pursuance of a statute of the Philippine Legislature
directing it."' 37 The opinion held that Congress has the power, inherent in
sovereignty, to deport aliens, and concluded that the Philippine Government
could do what unquestionably Congress might. While the Court discussed
briefly the Congressional power to deport aliens and the basis for this power,
it did not examine the validity of its exercise in this fashion. In every one
of the cases relied on, the constitutionality of general legislation regarding
aliens was being upheld; and in none of them was the question of constitu-
tional limitations on special legislation considered. From the proposition
that Congress can deport aliens no inference is to be drawn that it can
exercise its power without regard for the limitations set by the Constitution
on the exercise of all Congressional powers.
Finally, even if Congress could deport a nained alien by legislative act,
such a move would be unwise because inconsistent with the international
policy of the nation. This country has always insisted on proper procedures
in the deportation of aliens.38 A reversal of this attitude would be reflected
by other nations and inevitably be detrimental to American nationals abroad.
A second recent example of repressive special legislation is to be found
in the exclusion of David Lasser and Goodwin Watson from the benefits
of certain appropriation bills. The former was employed as personal assistant
to the head of the Works Project Administration; the latter, as chief analyst
for the Federal Communications Commission. Both had incurred the enmity
of individual Senators and Representatives. As head of the Workers Alli-
ance,39 Lasser had appeared before various committees of the Senate and
the House and offended their members by charging both Congress and the
Works Project Administration with graft and corruption.O Watson had been
branded by the Dies Committee as having been affiliated with a "Communist
37. Id. at 556.
38. See letter from Mr. Olney, Secretary of State, to ir. Young, United, States
Minister to Guatemala, dated January 30, 1896, quoted in 4 MooRE, DiwEsT OF IL,"m--
xATIONAL LAW (1906) 102 et seq.; letter from Mr. Gresham, Secretary of State, to
Mr. Smythe, United States Minister to Haiti, dated November 5, 1894, quoted id. at
82 et seq.; letter from Mr. Bayard, Secretary of State, to Mr. Lathrop, United States
Minister to Russia, dated July 1, 1887, quoted id. at 80; letter from Mr. Evarts, Secre-
tary of State, to Mr. Foster, United States Minister to Mexico, dated July 10, 1879,
quoted id. at 76 et seq.
39. The Workers' Alliance was the one big union of Works Project Administration
workers. When the Dies Committee declared that it was dominated by Communists,
Lasser left it and took his supporters, who constituted a large majority of the members,
with him.
40. See 87 Cong. Rec., June 20, 1941, at 5492. This w:as Lasser's only offense. He
was attacked by Congressmen for personal reasons.
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front" organization. 41 When the responsible heads of the departments to
which these men were attached refused to dismiss them at the request of
Congress, legislative reprisals were adopted. A few months before in an
effort to get rid of David J. Saposs, who was chief economist for the National
Labor Relations Board, Congress had forbidden the Board to maintain that
office. The maneuver, however, proved ineffectual; the Board merely changed
the name of the office and went on as before.42 In the light of this experience
Congress determined to deal with Lasser and Watson by name and provided
in the appropriation bills for their respective departments that no part of the
funds were to be used to pay their compensation. 43 Representative Boren
characterized the action as "exactly the same thing we did in the case of
Harry Bridges." 44
In considering exclusions from the benefits of appropriation bills the
primary question is whether under the separation of powers doctrine 46 Con-
gressional power exists to enact such measures. Since Congress has the power
of appropriation, it can grant or deny an appropriation, just as it can enact
or refuse to enact a law; and the only check on this power is public
opinion.40 Congress can withhold an appropriation for an entire department;
41. For an indication of the vilue of the Dies' records, see 88 Cong. Rec. Ap.,,
February 27, 1942, at A830; 88 Cong. Rec. App., February 25, 1942, at A792. See
also the letter of Vice President Wallace in the New York Times, March 30, 1940,
p. 1, col. 2, under the headline "36 Wallace Aides Accused as Reds".
42. See CUSHmAN, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSION (1941) 675. Thig
kind of "ripper" legislation is not effective since it is at the mercy of the appointing
power of the executive. See id. at 454; Stoner, Legislating the Incunbcnt out of Office
(1914) 12 Micra L. REv. 293; (1937) 86 U. OF PA. L. REv. 105.
43. The proviso naming David Lasser was included in the Emergency Relil
Appropriation Act, PUB. L. No. 143, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (July 1, 1941) § 1(a).
The one naming Watson was included in the Independent Offices Bill 1H. R. 6430, 77th
Cong., 2nd Sess. (Jan. 22, 1942). It passed the House but was struck out by the Senate
Committee on Appropriations.
44. 87 Cong Rec., June 12, 1941, at 5228. For an indication of Congressional inten-
tion to pass similar laws in the future, see 88 Cong. Rec., Jan. 22, 1942, at 584; 88 Cong.
Rec., Feb. 16, 1942, at 1331. Congress can, of course, employ more subtle techniques
than t~is. By the mere threat of withholding an entire appropriation it might gain con-
trol over appointments within an agency. See 2 INT. JURW. Ass'N. BULL. (1942) 1.
45. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 662 (1887) ; Green, Separation of Govern.
mental Powers, in 4 SELEcrED ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1938) 202; Larson,
Has the President an iderent Power of Removal of his Nou-Executive Appointees?
(1940) 16 TENN. L. REv. 259; Lowenstein, A Study in Comparative Constitutional Law
(1938) 5 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 566, 577; MADISON, 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 581 (1789):
"If there is a principle in our Constitution, indeed in any free Constitution, more
sacred than another, it is that which separates the Legislative, Executive and Judicial
Powers. If there is any point in which the separation of the Legislative and Executive
powers ought to be maintained with great caution, it is that which relates to officers and
offices."
46. See Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U. S. 548 (1900) at 577; MANSFIELD, THE Come,-
TROLLER GENERAL (1939) at 78.
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but to say it can provide that a specific individual in the employ of a
department shall not participate in an appropriation for it involves very dif-
ferent considerations. In the latter instance it would appear that Congress
while nominally exercising the granted power of appropriation actually in-
tends to effect the removal of the designated individual from office and is
therefore really exercising the power to remove.47 And in the great majority
of cases the power to appoint, and consequently the power to remove, falls
within the executive rather than the legislative function.
No reference to a power to remove from office is to be found in the
Constitution except for the provision for removal by impeachment.45 It is,
nevertheless, well settled that the power to remove is an incident of the power
to appoint since in the long run control over removal is control over appoint-
ment.49 With reference to the power of appointment the Constitution provides
that the President
"shall nominate and by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the
United States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise pro-
vided for, and which shall be established by Law; but the Congress
may by law vest the Appointment of such inferior officers, as they
think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in
the Heads of Departments." r0
The Supreme Court has not defined precisely the relative powers of the
President and Congress under this clause. It has decided, however, that
Congress has no power to limit the discretion of the President in removals
of officers from positions classified as "purely executive", since an exercise
of that power would constitute a direct encroachment on the executive power
of the President.51 From this it follows a fortiori that Congress has no power
to make removals from such offices; for if the President is to be held
responsible for the conduct of such officers, not only must he have unfettered
power of removal, but he must also be free from the exercise of the removal
power by outside authority. It would seem equally clear that Congress has no
constitutional power to remove officers from any other positions. 2 Though
47. See United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1 (1936); 37 Ois. Arrv GE.. 556
(1933); Warren, Presidential Declarations of Independence (1930) 10 B. U. L Rwv. 1.
48. U. S. CosT., Art. II, § 4.
49. Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926).
50. U. S. CoNsT., Art. II, § 2.
51. Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, (1926).
52. There is nothing in Humphrey's Ex'r (Rathbun) v. United States, 205 U. S.
602 (1936) to question this. All that case holds is that Congress can impose reasonable
regulations on the President's power to remove appointees of a certain class, as yet
undefined but including members of the Federal Trade Commission. From the holding
that the President has no arbitrary power to remove such appointees, no inference can
be drawn that Congress has such power.
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it has power to vest appointments of inferior officers in the President, the
Courts of Law, or the heads of departments, it does not itself have the power
to appoint and remove.5 3 The same argument seems to apply to the cases of
Lasser and Watson, who might be designated as employees rather than
officers.5 4 For Congress by statute vests the power to appoint and remove
employees in certain officers of the Government; and unless it otherwise
provides in the statute, it should not, without wholly changing the law, be
able subsequently to interfere with the exercise of that power by the specified
officers. For very practical reasons the power to remove should in all cases
be left to the governmental authority which has administrative control, since
this authority is normally the best judge of the qualifications of its employees.
Moreover, even if Congress had the power to remove, the Fifth Amend-
ment and the prohibition against bills pf attainder would probably prevent
its exercise in such arbitrary fashion; for these objections to deportation
of a specific individual by legislative act seem to apply also to removal from
office by the same method. In the two leading cases on bills of attainder
exclusion from any of the professions or any of the ordinary vocations of
life was held to be punishment.5 5 The legislative taking of a man's job is not
simply a removal from the specific position. It is in effect a legislative declara-
53. See Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, at 161 (1926) : "The Court also has
recognized in the Perkins case that Congress, in committing the appointment of
such inferior officers to the heads of departments, may prescribe incidental regulations
controlling and restricting the latter in the exercise of the power of removal.
But the Court never has held, nor reasonably could hold, although it is argued to the
contrary on behalf of appellant, that the exception clause enables Congress to draw
to itself, or to either branch of it, the power to remove or the right to partici-
pate in the exercise of that power. To do this would be to go beyond the words and
implications of that clause and to infringe the constitutional principle of the separation
of governmental powers." (Italics added). See also Springer v. Government of the
Philippine Islands, 277 U. S. 189, 202 (1928) ; Ekiu v. United States, 142 U. S. 651, 663
(1892) ; United States v. Ferreira, 13 How. 39 (U. S. 1851) ; State court holdings under
analogous provisions of state constitutions: People v. Tremaine, 252 N. Y. 27, 42, 168 N.
E. 817, 822 (1929) ; State ex rel. Tolerton v. Gordon, 236 Mo. 142, 169, 139 S. W. 403,
410 (1911) ; State ex rel. Worrell v. Carr, 129 Ind. 44, 28 N. E. 88 (1891). See also Col-
WIN, THE PRESIDENT (1940) 95; CUSHMAN, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMIS-
SIONS (1941) 575; RoTrsCHAEFER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1939) 408; 3 WiLLOUGnHB,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1929) 1510, 1512, 1524. For the opposite view, see Comment
(1929) 42 H~Av. L. Rv. 426. For a discussion of the powers conferred upon the legisla-
ture by state constitutions see Dawley, The Governor's Constitutional Powers of Appoit-
ment and Removal (1938) 22 MINNb. L. REv. 451; Mechem, Power to Appoint to Office
(1903) 1 MicH. L. REV. 531.
54. A distinction is made for some purposes between government officers and
employees. Whether it is to be made for the purpose of applying the Constitutional
provisions concerning the appointment power is not clear, but those provisions may be
so comprehensive as to include all appointees.
55. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333 (U. S. 1866) ; Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277
(U. S. 1866). See Barker v. State, 3 Cowen 686 (N. Y. 1824).
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tion that he is unfit for any federal office and, hence, an exclusion from that
field of economic endeavor.
It might further be argued that the legislative remov.al of a specific indi-
vidual from office is a violation of the due process clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment. The cases are in great confusion on the question of property rights
in jobs. While it is established that due process offers no justification for a
permanent sinecure in any federal administrative office, 0 no inference is to
be drawn from this that the incumbent of public office is not protected from
arbitrary removal; and, indeed, where the procedural aspects of due process
are involved, the courts occasionally assert that he has something "in the
nature" of a "property" right in his job. 7
Special legislation has also been employed in the attacks which Congress-
men have levelled at specific organizations. Attempts have been made to
"outlaw" the Communist Party, the German-American Bund, and the Kyff-
hauser Bund, s to exclude their candidates from the ballot 0 2 to make mem-
bership in them unlawful c6 to disqualify members from both public 1 and
private employment, 2 and to deport alien members. 3 The majority of these
bills have been lost in Senate and House committees. One, however, was
passed by both the legislative bodies and then recently vetoed by the Presi-
dent. This bill declared the Communist Party, the German-American Bund,
and the Kyffhiuser Bund to be foreign agents and required them to register
and file a list of their members.64
56. Note (1935) 99 A. L. R. 336.
57. Fugate v. Weston, 156 Va. 107, 157 S. E. 736 (1931); State c.r rel. Radd v.
Verage, 177 Wis. 295, 187 N. XV. 830 (1922); Ekern v. McGovern, 154 Wis. 157, 142
N. XV 595 (1913) ; State ex rel. Childs v. Wradhams, 64 Minn. 318, 324, 67 N. IV. 64,
67 (1896). See Dawley, The Govenor's Constitutional Power's of Appaintinent and
Removal (1938) 22 Mixx. L. RPv. 451, 474; Jennings, Removal from Public Off c in
Minnesota (1936) 20 MIN. L. REv. 721, 728. The President is, of course, under no
limitations in his removals from "purely executive" offices. Myers v. United States,
272 U. S. 52 (1926). It may further be noted that legislative removal defeats the purpose
of the Civil Service System which is supposed to give government employees reasonable
security by assuring them freedom from removal except on notice and for cause. See
37 STAT. 555, 5 U. S. C. § 652 (1934) ; Westwood, The "Rigit" of an Einployee of the
United States Against Arbitrary Discharge (193S) 7 GEo. WVAsu. L. REv. 212. More-
over, if these employees are made subservient to the Congress as well as to their imme-
diate superiors and the President, their effectiveness may be considerably hampered. For
elaboration, see REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S Co~urirr ou ADmiNISTATE MANAGEs-
-SENT (1937) 7; HART, TENum OF OFFiCE UNDER THE CONSTITUTIN; HLE.NnG, PUwUC
ADI NISTRATION AND THE PU33LIC INTEREsT (1936) 398; (1942) 2 Ii'. Jxu~ . Ass':
Bum- 1; (1936) 30 ILu_ L. REv. 1037.
58. S.1385, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (April 25, 1941).
59. H. Con. Res. 5, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (Jan. 8, 1941).
60. H.R.3455, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (Feb. 18, 1941).
61. Pub. Res. No. 88, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess. (June 26, 1940).
62. S.1970, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess. (May 27, 1940).
63. H. R. 1811, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (Jan. 10, 1941).
64. H.R.6269, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (Dec. 19, 1941). Vetoed by the President,
Feb. 9, 1942.
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The Registration of Foreign Agents Act, as amended by the Senate, defined
foreign agents generally 65 and required them to register and file a list of
their officers and employees under penalty for failure to do so of a fine of
not more than $10,000 or of imprisonment for not more than five years
or both. About a year after the passage of this Act Representative Dies
decided that under the terms of the Act it was the Attorney General's duty
to proceed against the Communist Party and the Bunds for. failure to comply
with it. When the Government did not do so the I-ouse at the instigation
of Dies and with eighty-two of its members present undertook to amend the
Act, so that there would be no discretion on the part of the Department of
Justice in interpreting it.
Unless it was to be justified under the war powers, the amendment would
seem to have been, in the light of what we have already seen, a bill of
attainder and therefore unconstitutional. Under the general law no one may
be punished for not registering unless it is proven upon trial that he is in
fact a foreign agent, but under the amendment such proof was dispensed
with as to the named organizations. The amendment conclusively established
that those organizations were in fact foreign agents and imposed criminal
penalties upon them unless they registered and furnished the information
required by the law. In addition, the amendment would seem to fall within
the Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws, for presumably it
was to be enacted because of past acts of the parties named yhich, when
committed, were not punishable under the general law. 0 That the punish-
ment was to be administered only upon failure to do some act in the future
would not save the measure, for it is settled that bills of attainder and ex post
facto laws may inflict punishment either absolutely or conditionally."1 More-
over, the amendment would seem to have been a violation of the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment since it created an irrebuttable presumption
of guilt.08
On broad grounds of policy numerous factors militate against any use at
all by Congress of repressive special legislation. In the past such legislation
has furnished many of the worst examples of the miscarriage of justice.00
This is not surprising in view of the susceptibility of the members of the
legislature to popular influence and the fact that designedly the legislature
reflects the short term wishes of the people. Elementary considerations
of justice require that each individual be governed by laws known to him in
advance and applicable to all other individuals similarly situated. In addition,
by occupying themselves with unimportant details of special legislation, legis-
65. See 87 Cong. Rec., Dec. 19, 1941, at 10289.
66. Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386 (U. S. 1798).
67. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333 (U. S. 1866); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U. S,
277 (1866).
68. Western and Atlantic R.R. v. Henderson, 279 U. S. 639 (1929).
69. See Pound, JTustice According to Law (1914) 14 CoL. L. REV. 1, 7-11.
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lative bodies tend to limit their effectiveness in laying down general rules on
matters of policy.70 For these reasons writers on constitutional theory have
postulated the fundamental principle that every one has a right to be governed
by general rules.71
Special legislation as recently revived is but another addition to a growing
list of repressive techniques aimed at allegedly subversive individuals and
groups. Legislative committees have engaged in Red hunts; criminal syndi-
calism statutes have been passed and enforced; denaturalization proceedings
have been instituted against naturalized citizens accused of radical activities;
and left-wing parties have been excluded from the ballot.72 Like these other
methods, special laws constitute a direct attack on personal liberties. In
bonsidering them the courts should, therefore, keep a watchful eye on the
tights of individuals and liberally construe the constitutional provisions for
their protection.
70. See for ea-mmple 1 MARYLAND CONSTITUTION.L COxNt. IIO (1264) 877.
71. 2 COOLEY, CONsMUTIONAL LInTATIONs (1927) 809.
72. See (1942) 51 YALE L. J. 1215, n. 1, 2, 3.
